The Doctrine of O\u27Brien v. O\u27Brien: A Critical Analysis by Davis, Kenneth R.
Pace Law Review 
Volume 13 
Issue 3 Winter 1994 Article 2 
January 1994 
The Doctrine of O'Brien v. O'Brien: A Critical Analysis 
Kenneth R. Davis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth R. Davis, The Doctrine of O'Brien v. O'Brien: A Critical Analysis, 13 Pace L. Rev. 863 
(1994) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more 
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
The Doctrine of O'Brien v. O'Brien:
A Critical Analysis
Kenneth R. Davis*
I. Introduction
In 1985 the New York Court of Appeals held in O'Brien v.
O'Brien1 that a medical license is marital property within the
meaning of section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law.2 The
O'Brien court ruled that a non-licensed spouse may be entitled
to a distributive share of the increased lifetime earning poten-
tial of the licensed spouse. 3
Many commentators have applauded O'Brien for compen-
sating the unlicensed spouse for contributions, whether finan-
cial or otherwise, to the acquisition of a license.4 O'Brien has
also been widely criticized, however, for encouraging "unbridled
speculation" in valuating the license, 5 and for imposing a finan-
* Assistant Professor of Legal & Ethical Studies, Fordham University Schools
of Business Administration; B.A. 1969, State University of New York at Bingham-
ton; M.A. 1971, University of California at Long Beach; J.D. 1977, University of
Toledo College of Law.
1. 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
2. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236 (McKinney 1986).
3. 66 N.Y.2d at 580-81, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744. Before adop-
tion of equitable distribution, a spouse who owned property in his or her name
during marriage was awarded that property upon divorce. See, e.g., Brian Dia-
mond & William F. Prinsell, Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A
Sweeping Reform, 47 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 70 (1980); Stephanie Rubino, Note, 17
SETON HALL L. REV. 963, 963 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Leslie F. Burns & Gregg A. Grauer, Note, Human Capital as Mari-
tal Property, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499 (1990); Michael R. Herman, Note, Not What
the Doctor Ordered - Medical License Declared Marital Property: O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 539, 545 (1986); Frances Lynch, Comment, Family
Law: O'Brien v. O'Brien: A Professional Degree As Marital Property, 29 ARiz. L.
REV. 353, 359 (1987); Scott E. Willoughby, Note, Professional Licenses as Marital
Property: Responses to Some of O'Brien's Unanswered Questions, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 133, 147 (1987).
5. See, e.g., William A. Callison, Comment, Professional Licenses and Marital
Dissolution in O'Brien v. O'Brien: Expectation Returns in the Marital Partnership,
72 IowA L. REV. 445, 460-61 (1987); Herman, supra note 4, at 545; Rubino, supra
note 3, at 978.
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cial burden on the licensed spouse that might compel the pur-
suit of an unwanted or even unattainable lifelong career.6
In the landmark decision, In re Marriage of Graham,7 the
Supreme Court of Colorado argued cogently that a license is not
marital property, because it has none of the attributes of prop-
erty and represents a uniquely personal accomplishment of its
holder.8 An overwhelming majority of states which have con-
fronted the issue, either at the intermediate appellate court
level,9 or at the high court level,10 have aligned themselves with
6. See, e.g., Callison, supra note 5, at 462; Herman, supra note 4, at 552;
Brenda R. Sharton, Note, Spousal Interest in Professional Degrees: Solving The
Compensation Dilemma, 31 B.C. L. REV. 749, 769 (1990); Willoughby, supra note 4,
at 153.
7. 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
8. Id. at 77. In holding that a Master's degree in business administration is
not marital property, the court said:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even
by the broadest view of the concept of "property." It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is
personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inher-
itable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An
advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous educa-
tion, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the
mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that
may potentially result in the future acquisition of property.
Id.; see also Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 477 (W. Va. 1988) (Holding that a medi-
cal degree is not marital property, the court said: "On the whole, a degree of any
kind results primarily from the efforts of the student who earns it. Financial and
emotional support are important, as are homemaker services, but they bear no
logical relationship to the value of the resulting degree.").
9. E.g., Jones v. Jones, 454 So. 2d 1006, 1009 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (law de-
gree); Wisner v. Wisner, 631 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (medical li-
cense); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(undergraduate degrees); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 470 N.E.2d 551, 559 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984) (osteopathic degree and license to practice surgery); McManama v.
McManama, 386 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (law license), vacated and
transferred, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 1980); Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982) (law license); Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1986) (dental license); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980) (medical license); Marion v. Marion, 401 S.E.2d 432, 438 (Va. Ct. App. 1991)
(veterinary degree). A lower court in Delaware has rejected the O'Brien doctrine.
Wright v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803, 806 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983) (dental degree).
10. E.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct. App. 1982), super-
seded, 691 P.2d 1020 (Cal. 1984) (statute amended to provide non-titled spouse
with reimbursement for financial contributions made to education of titled
spouse); Olar v. Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 680 (Colo. 1980) (doctoral degrees in physiol-
ogy and biophysics); Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 852 (Ky. 1982) (dental li-
cense); Sweeny v. Sweeny, 534 A.2d 1290, 1291 (Me. 1987) (medical license);
864
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Graham, disapproving of the O'Brien doctrine. 1 Many of these
cases were decided under statutes virtually identical to the New
York equitable distribution law. 12 A few states have enacted
legislation, explicitly or impliedly, rejecting O'Brien.'3
The high court of only one other state, Iowa, has held that a
non-licensed spouse should share in the increased earning po-
Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (Md. 1985) (medical license); Drapek v.
Drapek, 503 N.E.2d 946, 950 (Mass. 1987) (medical license); Ruben v. Ruben, 461
A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 1983) (doctoral degree and career in electron microscopy); Ma-
honey v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 536 (N.J. 1982) (Master's degree in business ad-
ministration); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 498 P.2d 1357, 1358 (N.M. 1972) (medical
license); Haywood v. Haywood, 415 S.E.2d 565, 570 (N.C. 1992) (Master's degrees
in economics and business); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487, 493 (N.D. 1978)
(expectancy of future earnings as entrepreneur); Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d
131, 135 (Ohio 1986) (veterinary degree); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750
(Okla. 1979) (per curiam) (medical degree); In re Marriage of Stuart, 813 P.2d 49,
51 (Or. 1991) (medical license); Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15, 17 (Pa. 1986) (medi-
cal degree); Helm v. Helm, 345 S.E.2d 720, 21 (S.C. 1986) (medical degree); Wehr-
camp v. Wehrcamp, 357 N.W.2d 264, 266 (S.D. 1984) (dental license); Martinez v.
Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 539-40 (Utah 1991) (medical license); Downs v. Downs,
574 A.2d 156, 158 (Vt. 1990) (medical degree); In re Marriage of Washburn, 677
P.2d 152, 158 (Wash. 1984) (veterinary license); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 474
(W. Va. 1988) (medical license); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Wis.
1982) (medical degree); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984)
(Master's degree in accounting).
11. A few courts that have declined to follow the O'Brien doctrine have not
foreclosed its adoption under compelling circumstances. Nelson v. Nelson, 736
P.2d 1145, 1146, 1147 (Alaska 1987) (holding that an accounting degree is not
marital property, but intimating that under facts similar to those presented in
O'Brien a different result might be reached); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d
755 (Minn. 1981). In DeLa Rosa, the husband had begun but had not completed
his medical studies when the parties divorced. Holding that the wife had no prop-
erty interest in the medical degree, awarded after the divorce, the court allowed
that, under different circumstances, a degree might be marital property. Id. at
758-59.
12. E.g., Beeler, 715 S.W.2d at 627 (applying TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121
(1984)); Hoak, 370 S.E.2d at 475 (applying W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32 (1986)); Lund-
berg, 318 N.W.2d at 922 (applying Wis. STAT. § 247.255 (1977)). Therefore, one
cannot forcefully argue that the New York equitable distribution statute con-
strained the Court of Appeals to hold that a license is marital property.
13. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns 1986) (providing reimbursement as
the exclusive remedy to a non-licensed spouse who contributed, directly or indi-
rectly, to the acquisition of the other spouse's license); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20(b)(2) (1987) (providing that a license is separate property); see CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2641 (West Supp. 1994) (a community property statute, which provides, as does
the Indiana statute, that reimbursement is the non-licensed spouse's exclusive
remedy); for a discussion of the relevant statutes, see generally THOMAS S. OLD-
HAM, DIVORCE SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 9.02, at 9-3 to 9-
13 (1987).
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tential of the licensed spouse. The Iowa Supreme Court, how-
ever, declined to rule that a license is marital property. 14 One
other state has a conflict of authority on the issue.15
Yet O'Brien flourishes in New York. The courts have ex-
tended its holding, not only to all licenses and degrees acquired
during marriage which enhance earning potential, 16 but also to
increases in earning potential arising from professional "dis-
tinction" during marriage17 and celebrity status attained in a
career which pre-existed the marriage.' 8
Under certain circumstances the appreciation during mar-
riage of separate property is subject to equitable distribution.19
Some New York decisions have characterized a spouse's ad-
vancement in a career that pre-existed the marriage as appreci-
ation of separate property, and therefore as a distributable
marital asset.20
14. In In re Marriage of Horstman, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978), the court
held that a law license is not marital property, but that "it is the potential for
increase in future earning capacity made possible by the law degree and certificate
of admission conferred upon the husband with the aid of his wife's efforts which
constitute the asset for distribution by the court." Id. at 891. Although the court
awarded only reimbursement to the wife for actual expenditures, the above quote,
along with the court's pronouncement that "other measures ... could have been
used to establish the value of the respondent's education," id., appeared to presage
an award based on earning potential. In In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59
(Iowa 1989), the court reaffirmed that a medical license is not marital property.
Id. at 62. Characterizing its award to the wife as "reimbursement alimony," id. at
64, the court based the award on the husband's increased lifetime earning poten-
tial. Id. at 65. The court assumed, in its calculations, that the process of acquiring
the degree accounted for 30% of the increased earning potential occasioned by the
degree, and awarded the wife 50% of this sum. Id.
15. A Michigan intermediate appellate court has held that a license is marital
property. E.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 337 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983). Contra, e.g., Olah v. Olah, 354 N.W.2d 359, 361-62 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that a medical degree is not marital property, but that the non-titled
spouse should be compensated with alimony). In addition, the Woodworth court
held that the remedy of the non-licensed spouse is to share in the increased life-
time earning potential of the other spouse's law degree. Woodworth, 337 N.W.2d
at 337. Most recently, the court has dodged the issue. Daniels v. Daniels, 418
N.W.2d 924, 927 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that non-titled spouse is entitled to
compensation for titled spouse's acquisition of dental degree, whether compensa-
tion is characterized as a share of the value of the degree or as maintenance).
16. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 95-126 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
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A spouse may elect not to use a license. At least one court
has held that the non-licensed spouse is, nevertheless, entitled
to share in the increased earning expectation of the licensed
spouse. 21
When the licensed spouse founds or joins a professional
practice, the license or degree may be deemed to have "merged"
into the practice. Under the merger doctrine, the non-licensed
spouse may be entitled to a distributive share of the value of the
licensed spouse's interest in the partnership rather than a
share of the value of the license. 22 The purpose of this doctrine
is to avoid double recovery, which would result from awarding a
share in both the license and the partnership. 23 However, re-
cent authority has eroded this doctrine holding that the non-
licensed spouse may be entitled to share in both.24
When confronting other issues, the courts have been simi-
larly inclined to take positions affording the non-titled spouse
the greatest recovery. One such area concerns whether the non-
titled spouse may share in the value of a license earned before
the marriage, but not awarded until after the marriage, and
whether the non-titled spouse may share in the value of a li-
cense partially earned, but not completed, during the mar-
riage.25 The courts have shown the same predisposition when
valuating partnership interests for purposes of equitable distri-
bution,26 and when determining what events mark the termina-
tion of distributive rights of the non-titled spouse. 27
This article examines the development of the O'Brien doc-
trine in New York, and suggests that the doctrine has failed to
balance equitably the interests of the parties involved in di-
vorce. It concludes that fairness and the very language of New
York's equitable distribution law require a two-pronged ap-
proach to compensating the contributing, non-titled spouse.
Such a spouse should be compensated with an increased share
of existing marital assets rather than by mischaracterizing a
license or career potential as marital property. Alternatively, if
21. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 162-89 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 190-203 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 228-66 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 204-27 and accompanying text.
1994]
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adequate marital assets are unavailable to reach a fair resolu-
tion, maintenance should be adjusted to achieve a satisfactory
remedy. 28
II. O'Brien v. O'Brien
A. The Facts
When the O'Briens were married in April of 1971 both were
teachers at a private school. The wife, who had a bachelor's de-
gree and a temporary teaching certificate, required eighteen
months of post-graduate study to acquire a permanent teaching
certificate.29 The husband had completed three and one-half
years of college. After the marriage, he graduated from college,
and in 1973 the couple moved to Guadalajara, Mexico, where
the husband became a full-time medical student. During the
three years the husband studied medicine, the wife held several
teaching positions.30 Her earnings paid for most of the couple's
joint expenses including the cost of the husband's education. In
December 1976 they returned to New York where the husband
completed his medical training, while the wife continued teach-
ing. In 1980, two months after receiving a license to practice
medicine, the husband commenced a divorce action.31
The court confronted the issue of whether a medical license
is marital property within the meaning of New York's Domestic
Relations Law. Section 236(B)(1)(c) defines marital property as:
all property acquired by either or both spouses during the mar-
riage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the
commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in
which title is held, except as otherwise provided in agreement
pursuant to subdivision three of this part. Marital property shall
not include separate property as hereinafter defined. 32
28. See infra notes 267-88 and accompanying text.
29. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 581, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d
743, 744 (1985).
30. Id.; 489 N.E.2d at 417, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
31. Id. at 581-82, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
32. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986). Section 236(B)(1)(d)
defines separate property as follows:
The term separate property shall mean:
(1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, de-
vise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse;
(2) compensation for personal injuries;
868 [Vol. 13:863
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B. The Court's Analysis
Judge Simons, author of the opinion, began his analysis by
observing that the statutory definition of marital property is not
bound by traditional "property concepts, because there is no
common law property interest remotely resembling marital
property." 33 Rather, Judge Simons said, it is a creature of stat-
ute, and as such its meaning must be gleaned, to the extent pos-
sible, from the statutory language itself. He found guidance as
to the statutory meaning in Domestic Relations Law section
236(B)(5)(d). 34 This subsection, which sets forth considerations
relevant to determining how marital property should be di-
vided, provides in part:
the court shall consider:...
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect con-
tribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by
the party not having title, including joint efforts or expendi-
tures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage
earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of
the other party [and] ...
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component
asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession.35
Judge Simons concluded that this subsection includes profes-
sional licenses within the definition of marital property.36
To bolster his interpretation of the statute, Judge Simons
looked to the legislative history of section 236. He noted that
inequities had commonly arisen when traditional property con-
cepts had been applied to divide marital property in divorce pro-
ceedings.37 These inequities spurred a call to reform the law.3 8
(3) property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate
property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the
contributions or efforts of the other spouse;
(4) property described as separate property by written agreement of the
parties pursuant to subdivision three of this part.
Id.
33. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746 (1985).
34. Id. at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47.
35. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney 1986) (emphases added).
36. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47.
37. Id. at 584-85, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
38. Id.
1994] 869
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Equitable distribution, a new concept, was created and enacted
into law to provide a fairer system for the division of marital
assets. 39 This approach recognizes that marriage is an eco-
nomic partnership in which the achievements of one spouse al-
most inevitably result from the efforts of both, whether as
spouse, parent, wage earner, or homemaker.40 Judge Simons
observed that the non-licensed spouse may have contributed to
the acquisition of the license by providing financial support,
raising children, or homemaking, and may, in addition, have
foregone career opportunities. 41 He concluded, therefore, that
the acquisition of a professional license during marriage is mar-
ital property.42
Applying this standard to the O'Brien case, Judge Simons
emphasized that the wife had sacrificed her teaching career to
follow her husband to Mexico, and that she had provided their
principal source of support throughout her husband's educa-
tion.43 She was, therefore, entitled to a distributive share of the
value of the license, measured by the "enhanced earning capac-
ity it affords its holder."44 Accordingly, the court remitted the
case for a determination of the value of the husband's medical
39. Id. at 585, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
40. Id.; see Governor's Memorandum of Approval of ch. 281, N.Y. Laws (June
19, 1980), reprinted in 1980 N.Y. Laws 1863 (McKinney) ("The bill [proposing the
adoption of Act approved June 19, 1980, ch. 281, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1225, the law of
equitable distribution] recognizes that the marriage relationship is also an eco-
nomic partnership."); Memorandum of Ass. Burrows, reprinted in 1980 N.Y. LEGIS.
ANN. 129, 130 ("[Mlodern marriage should be viewed as a form of partnership.").
41. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 585, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
42. Id. Before O'Brien, there was a conflict of authority as to whether a li-
cense was marital property. Compare Litman v. Litman, 93 A.D.2d 695, 696, 463
N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 (2d Dep't 1983) (per curiam) (holding that law license is marital
property), affd, 61 N.Y.2d 918, 463 N.E.2d 34, 474 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1984), with Con-
ner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 102, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 492 (2d Dep't 1983) (holding
that M.B.A. is not marital property), and Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 157,
452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938 (4th Dep't) (holding that medical license is not marital prop-
erty), appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 956 (1982).
43. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 576, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
44. Id. at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749. This method of valua-
tion is known as "capitalization of excess earnings." Marguerite H. Cameron,
Note, The Valuation Of A Professional Practice In Equitable Distribution - Poore v.
Poore, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 327, 341 (1987).
870 [Vol. 13:863
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license and the distributive share to which the wife was
entitled.45
Judge Meyer concurred.46 Though agreeing with the major-
ity that a license is marital property under the equitable distri-
bution law, he voiced concerns about the unfairness that might
result from a distributive award imposed against a professional
still in training, and he appealed to the legislature to change
the law.47 He noted:
[A] professional in training who is not finally committed to a ca-
reer choice when the distributive award is made may be locked
into a particular kind of practice simply because the monetary ob-
ligations imposed by the distributive award made on the basis of
the trial judge's conclusion (prophesy may be a better word) as to
what the career choice will be leaves him or her no alternative. 48
Judge Meyer pointed out that a newly licensed professional
might be disabled and incapable of practicing his or her profes-
sion.49 Since a distributive award made pursuant to section 236
appears not to be subject to modification, 50 such an award
would work injustice. 51
In O'Brien, as soon as the husband received his medical li-
cense, he abandoned the wife who had supported him through
medical school. 52 It is understandable why the court, given
such compelling facts, fashioned the rule that a license earned
during a marriage is marital property subject to equitable dis-
tribution and that the value of the asset is the increased life-
time earning potential of the licensed spouse. The lower courts
of New York, following the lead of the high court, have extended
this rule beyond all reasonable bounds.5 3
45. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 590, 591, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at
749, 751.
46. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 591,489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer,
J., concurring).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 592, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
50. Id.; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney 1986).
51. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 592, 489 N.E.2d at 720-21, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751-52
(Meyer, J., concurring).
52. This situation is a classic example of the so-called 'student spouse/work-
ing spouse syndrome."
53. See, e.g., infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
19941
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C. A Critique of the O'Brien Doctrine
The failings of O'Brien, and cases which have followed it,
are threefold. First, the court employed faulty analysis by hold-
ing that, under section 236, increased earning potential is mari-
tal property. Although the court correctly stated that its task
was to determine whether a license is marital property within
the meaning of section 236(B)(1)(c), 5 4 the definitional section, it
erroneously relied on section 236(B)(5)(d)(6), the distributional
section, to conclude that the legislature's definition of marital
property encompassed "a license to practice medicine." 5 Refer-
ring to section 236(B)(5)(d)(6), the court asserted that:
The words mean exactly what they say: that an interest in a pro-
fession or a professional career potential is marital property
which may be represented by direct or indirect contributions of
the non-title-holding spouse, including financial contributions
and non-financial contributions made by caring for the home and
family. 56
This section, however, does not define marital property as sug-
gested by the court.57 Rather, it prescribes the equitable factors
relevant to dividing assets which fall within the definition of
marital property set forth in section 236(B)(1)(c).5s Thus, for ex-
ample, if a married couple buys a home with funds earned by
one spouse, the home is marital property, under section
236(B)(1)(c), even if title is in the name of the working spouse.
Under section 236(B)(5)(d)(6), the non-working spouse will be
entitled, upon divorce, to a share of the value of the home,
based, in part, on contributions as "spouse, parent, ... and
homemaker."59 Similarly, if one spouse contributes directly or
indirectly to the "career or career potential of the other party,"
the contributing spouse will be entitled to a greater share in the
marital property than would otherwise have been the case. 60
However, nothing in section 236(B)(1)(c) of the Domestic Rela-
54. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
55. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986); see Herman,
supra note 4, at 545-46.
56. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
57. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
58. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986); see Herman,
supra note 4, at 545-46.
59. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
60. Id.
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tions Law suggests that marital property includes increased
earning potential resulting from the acquisition of a license.61
Second, measuring increased earning potential by assum-
ing the titled spouse will maximize earnings may have devas-
tating consequences on the life of the titled spouse. A person
may become incapacitated and, therefore, unable to use a li-
cense, 62 or a person may choose to pursue a career less lucrative
than that followed by the "average licensed person."63 For ex-
ample, an award under O'Brien, based on the average lifetime
earnings of a physician, might compel a doctor to abandon plans
to conduct medical research.
Third, the magnitude of awards made under O'Brien seems
to follow from the unrealistic premise that the process of acquir-
ing a license accounts for all the financial benefits that may re-
sult, ignoring the importance of years of hard work and
dedication.6
61. See In re Marriage of Weinstein, 470 N.E.2d 551, 559 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(Construing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503(d) (1981), an equitable distribution
provision similar to New York law, the court said: "Rather than being classified as
marital assets, a spouse's professional degree or license, earned while married
through the financial support of the other spouse, is a relevant factor in distribu-
tion of the couple's marital assets and liabilities.").
62. The equitable distribution provisions of the Domestic Relations Law
were intended to provide flexibility so that equity could be done. But if the
assumption as to career choice on which a distributive award payable over a
number of years is based turns out not to be the fact (as, for example, should
a general surgery trainee accidentally lose the use of his hand), it should be
possible for the court to revise the distributive award to conform to the fact.
O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 592, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer, J.,
concurring).
63. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Maloney v. Maloney, 137 A.D.2d 666, 666, 524 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760-
61 (2d Dep't 1988) (awarding the wife 35% of the increased lifetime earning poten-
tial of the husband's medical degree earned during marriage where the parties
separated after eleven years of marriage and divorced five years later); Allocco v.
Allocco, 152 Misc. 2d 529, 536-37, 578 N.Y.S.2d 995, 1000 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1991) (awarding the wife 50% of the projected increased lifetime earnings resulting
from the husband's promotion to police lieutenant during the marriage which
lasted twenty-five years); Madori v. Madori, 151 Misc. 2d 737, 741, 573 N.Y.S.2d
553, 556 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1991) (awarding the wife 40% of the pro-
jected increased lifetime earnings arising from husband's expertise gained in
emergency room medicine during marriage where the parties separated after three
years of marriage, and divorced three years later).
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The courts of New York have compounded these problems
by expanding the O'Brien doctrine with holdings that defy com-
mon sense and breed injustice. 65
III. Marital Property
A. Licenses and Degrees
The courts have held that all income enhancing licenses,
even those not customarily associated with professional prac-
tices, are marital property.66
A more controversial issue was whether academic degrees
are sufficiently analogous to professional licenses to be deemed
marital property. In McGowan v. McGowan67 the wife, during
the twenty-four year marriage, earned a Master's degree. The
husband argued that the degree was marital property.68
The court recognized the important distinction between
licenses and degrees. Earning an academic degree signifies the
attainment of a level of proficiency in an area of study which
may not confer the right to engage in a profession as would a
license.69 The court observed, however, that O'Brien was based
on the increased earning capacity resulting from the license,
rather than on the right to practice.70 Therefore, the court rea-
soned that a degree enhances earning capacity much the same
as does a license, and that for purposes of equitable distribu-
tion, no distinction should be drawn between the two. 71
65. See, e. g., infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
66. E.g., Duspiva v. Duspiva, 181 A.D.2d 810, 811, 581 N.Y.S.2d 376, 377 (2d
Dep't 1992) (license to practice as certified public accountant); Holihan v. Holihan,
159 A.D.2d 685, 686, 553 N.Y.S.2d 434, 436 (2d Dep't 1990) (license to work as
guidance counselor); Kyle v. Kyle, 156 A.D.2d 508, 509, 548 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783 (2d
Dep't 1989) (school principal license); Anderson v. Anderson, 153 A.D.2d 823, 825,
545 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (2d Dep't 1989) (degrees and licenses in health administra-
tion); Morimando v. Morimando, 145 A.D.2d 609, 609, 536 N.Y.S.2d 701, 701 (2d
Dep't 1988) (license to practice as a physician's assistant); DeStefano v. DeStefano,
119 A.D.2d 793, 793, 501 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (2d Dep't 1986) (medical license);
Cronin v. Cronin, 131 Misc. 2d 879, 880-81, 502 N.Y.S.2d 369-70 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1986) (license to practice law).
67. 142 A.D.2d 355, 535 N.Y.S.2d 990 (2d Dep't 1988).
68. Id. at 358, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
69. Id. at 359, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 361, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 993-94; see also DiCaprio v. DiCaprio, 162
A.D.2d 944, 945, 556 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1012 (4th Dep't 1990) (Master's Degree and
permanent certificate to work as school administrator is marital property), appeal
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B. Unused Licenses
A serious failing of the O'Brien doctrine is that it awards a
share of the earnings of a hypothetical future career to the non-
titled spouse even when it is clear that such a career has not
and will not materialize.7 2 Such was the case in Savasta v.
Savasta.7 3 The husband was a medical student in Belgium,
when he met his wife, who was a nurse. The couple married in
Canada, while the husband was finishing his internship.74 Five
years later, the husband received board certification to practice
internal medicine. During the next seven years, however, until
the couple divorced, he never practiced in this specialty, opting
instead to practice emergency medicine which is less lucrative.7 5
Holding that the husband's license to practice internal
medicine was marital property,7 6 the court rejected the hus-
band's argument that because he had never practiced internal
medicine, the license was not marital property. The court
awarded the wife ten percent of the average annual earnings of
an internist less the average annual earnings of a general prac-
titioner multiplied by 25.6 years, the expected duration of the
husband's career.77 To justify this holding, the court observed
that the husband was currently only thirty-eight and had ex-
pressed an interest in practicing internal medicine, though cir-
cumstances prevented him from doing So. 7 8 While candidly
admitting that it could not "foretell the future,"7 9 the court di-
vined that the husband would likely practice internal medicine
dismissed, 77 N.Y.2d 802, 567 N.E.2d 981, 566 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1991); Allocco v. Al-
locco, 152 Misc. 2d 529, 534-35, 578 N.Y.S.2d 995, 998-99 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1991) (holding that where a policeman earned an Associate's Degree and Bache-
lor's Degree, which, although not pre-requisites for advancement, may have aided
in his promotion to police lieutenant, the increased earning potential resulting
from the promotions was a marital asset). Contra Cronin v. Cronin, 131 Misc. 2d
879, 883, 502 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1986) (holding that un-
dergraduate degree in marketing is not marital property).
72. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 591, 489 N.E.2d 712, 720, 498
N.Y.S.2d 743, 751 (1985) (Meyer, J., concurring); Sharton, supra note 6, at 766;
Willoughby, supra note 4, at 153.
73. 146 Misc. 2d 101, 549 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1989).
74. Id. at 102, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
75. Id. at 103, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46.
76. Id., 549 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
77. Id. at 107-09, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 548-49.
78. Id., 549 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
79. Id. at 107, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
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sometime in the future. The court acknowledged, however, that
if the license had lain dormant for thirty years, an award based
on the earning potential of the license would have been inappro-
priate.8 0 Hence, the court penalized a titled spouse who fol-
lowed a career which failed to optimize earnings.
C. Professional Distinction and Celebrity Status
Subsequent cases, following O'Brien, have extended the
definition of marital property beyond licenses and degrees. In
McAlpine v. McAlpine,8' the court confronted the issue of
whether the attainment of professional "distinction" during
marriage is a marital asset. The husband was an actuary
before marrying. During the marriage he became a fellow in
the Society of Actuaries. Because this honor hypothetically
brought an enhanced earning capacity, the court held it to be
marital property.8 2 In so holding, the court said: "[A] trend has
developed wherein the court will consider as a marital asset,
the enhanced earning capacity that a party has achieved during
marriage by virtue of attaining a professional license, academic
degree or other accomplishment." 3 Because the wife had not
contributed, financially or otherwise, to the husband's achieve-
ment of professional distinction, the court did not award her a
share of the husband's increased earning potential.8 4
O'Brien was expanded even further in Elkus v. Elkus.85
When Frederica von Stade, an opera singer, was married in
1973, she performed minor roles at the Metropolitan Opera,
earning an annual income of approximately $2,000. During the
course of her seventeen year marriage, she achieved interna-
tional acclaim, and her income rose meteorically. In 1989, the
year prior to her divorce, she earned over $600,000. Through
much of the marriage, her husband functioned as her voice
coach and teacher, travelled with her on tour, critiqued her re-
hearsals and performances, and photographed her for
80. Id. at 108, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
81. 143 Misc. 2d 30, 539 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1989).
82. Id. at 31, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
83. Id. at 32, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 33, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
85. 169 A.D.2d 134, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1st Dep't 1991), appeal dismissed, 79
N.Y.2d 851, 588 N.E.2d 99, 580 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992).
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magazines and album covers. 86 The issue was whether the in-
creased earning potential, occasioned by her celebrity status,
was marital property. The wife argued that celebrity status is
not marital property because (1) it is not licensed, (2) it is not
"owned" in the sense that a business is owned, and (3) it is not
protected by due process, as are traditional property rights.87
The court rejected her arguments, holding that "[t]hings of
value acquired during marriage are marital property even
though they may fall outside the scope of traditional property
concepts."8 8 Noting that O'Brien is not limited to careers which
are licensed or require degrees, the court stated: "Any attempt
to limit marital property to professions which are licensed
would only serve to discriminate against the spouses of those in
other areas of employment."8 9 The court also relied heavily, as
had the O'Brien court, on section 236(B)(5)(d)(6), 90 which pro-
vides, "[i]n determining an equitable distribution of property"
the court shall consider "any equitable claim to, interest in, or
direct or indirect contribution made.., to the career or the ca-
reer potential of the other party."91 Because von Stade's hus-
band had contributed to her rise to stardom, the court held that
he was entitled to a share of the "appreciation" of her career. 92
As in O'Brien, the court misinterpreted section
236(B)(5)(d)(6), 93 which does not define marital property, but
rather prescribes the factors relevant to dividing it.94
86. Id. at 135-36, 571 N.Y.S.2d 901-02.
87. Id. at 136, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 137, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
90. Id. at 140, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
91. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
92. Elkus, 169 A.D.2d at 140, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 904-05; see Golub v. Golub, 139
Misc. 2d 440, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988). In Golub, the court
ruled that the increased earning potential arising from Marisa Berenson's status
as a film star and model was marital property subject to equitable distribution. Id.
at 446-47, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 950. In holding "fame" to be marital property, the court
noted that "the right to exploit a celebrity's fame has been held to descend to his
heirs." Id. at 445, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 949 (citing Price v. Hal Roach Studios Inc., 400
F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
93. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
94. Equitable distribution involves three phases: classification, valuation and
division of marital property. The classification phase, governed by N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAw § 236 (B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986), should not be confused with the distribu-
tion phase, governed by N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236 (B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986). See
Herman, supra note 4, at 545-46.
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Elkus may also be criticized because it presumes that a ce-
lebrity's career will never founder or fail. Frederica von Stade
may fall out of favor with the public, her voice may be injured,
or she may choose, as should be her prerogative, to renounce
her fame. The court's decision denies these possibilities.
D. Appreciation of Separate Property
Section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law creates two cat-
egories of property, marital property 5 and separate property.96
Marital property is defined as "all property acquired by either
or both spouses during the marriage."97 Separate property,
which is described as an exception to marital property, 98 in-
cludes, among other things, property "acquired before marriage
or property acquired by bequest, devise, or descent, or gift from
a party other than the spouse."99 Separate property also in-
cludes "the increase in value of separate property, except to the
extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions
or efforts of the other spouse."100 The relevant subsection,
236(B)(1)(d)(3), makes clear that where the non-titled spouse
contributes financially during marriage to the appreciation of
separate property owned by the other spouse, the non-titled
spouse is entitled to a distributive share of the appreciation. 10 1
Section 236(B)(1)(d)(3) does not provide specifically
whether contributions or efforts as spouse, homemaker and par-
ent, as opposed to financial contributions, entitle the non-titled
spouse to a distributive share of the appreciation. This was the
issue in Price v. Price.10 2 There, the husband received gifts of
stock from his father, the value of which appreciated during the
marriage. The wife argued that her contributions as home-
maker and parent entitled her to a distributive share of the
appreciation. 0 3
95. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986).
96. See id. § 236(B)(1)(d).
97. See id. § 236(B)(1)(c).
98. See id. § 236(B)(1)(c).
99. See id. § 236(B)(1)(d)(1).
100. See id. § 236(B)(1)(d)(3).
101. See Vogel v. Vogel, 149 A-D.2d 501, 503, 539 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984 (2d Dep't
1989).
102. 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986).
103. Id. at 14, 503 N.E.2d at 686, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
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The court based its analysis on the policy of the Equitable
Distribution Law, which recognizes that a marriage is an eco-
nomic partnership and that non-financial contributions are as
significant as financial ones. 10 4 This policy is evident in section
236(B)(5)(d)(6), which directs the court to consider "contribu-
tions and services as a spouse, parent ... and homemaker" in
distributing marital property.10 5 Although the court found no
analogous provision relating specifically to the distribution of
appreciation of separate property,10 6 it believed that to effectu-
ate the statutory policy, it should construe "marital property"
broadly 10 7 and "separate property" narrowly. 08 The court found
support for this view in section 236(B)(1)(d)(3) where the words
"contributions or efforts" are used in an inclusive and general
sense, implying that contributions and efforts as parent,
spouse, and homemaker should be considered in distributing
appreciation to separate property. 10 9 By contrast, separate
property is described as an exception to marital property, 10 im-
plying a restrictive meaning."' The court, therefore, concluded
that the efforts of a spouse as parent, spouse, and homemaker
entitle that spouse to a distributive share of the appreciation of
the other spouse's separate property. 112
The husband argued that since the legislature had speci-
fied that contributions and efforts as parent, spouse, and home-
maker be considered in making an equitable distribution of
marital property 1 3 and in awarding maintenance, 1 4 the legisla-
ture's failure to include similar language with respect to the ap-
preciation of separate property indicates the contrary statutory
104. Id., 503 N.E.2d at 687, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
105. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
106. Price, 69 N.Y.2d at 15, 503 N.E.2d at 687-88, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 222-23.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986).
111. Price, 69 N.Y.2d at 14, 503 N.E.2d at 687-88, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 222-23.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 16, 503 N.E.2d at 688, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 223; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
114. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(6)(a)(8) (McKinney 1986), which provides
in pertinent part: "In determining the amount and duration of maintenance the
court shall consider:... (8) contributions and services of the party seeking mainte-
nance as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or ca-
reer potential of the other party."
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intent.115 Based on its understanding of the purpose of the stat-
ute - to accord the broadest possible meaning to "marital prop-
erty" - the court rejected this argument."16 The court limited
its ruling, however, to instances where the non-financial contri-
butions of the non-titled spouse facilitated the increase in
value.1" Where appreciation occurs solely as the result of mar-
ket forces,1 8 the non-titled spouse will not share in the
appreciation."19
In Mahlab v. Mahlab, 20 the court followed this rule.
There, the husband sought a share of the appreciation of the
marital home, although the wife's father had provided the
money for the down payment, closing costs, and mortgage pay-
ments. Citing Price, the court rejected the husband's claim, be-
cause "the appreciation was 'passive,' that is, predicated solely
on an improving real estate market."12'
The same court confronted a similar issue in Robinson v.
Robinson.122 Before marrying, the husband purchased a condo-
115. Price, 69 N.Y.2d at 16, 503 N.E.2d at 688, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
116. Id., 503 N.E.2d at 689, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
117. Accord Nolan v. Nolan, 107 A.D.2d 190, 193, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415, 419 (3d
Dep't 1985) (awarding share of appreciation of home to non-titled spouse, because
marital assets were used to improve it); DeMarco v. DeMarco, 143 A.D.2d 328, 331,
532 N.Y.S.2d 293, 296 (2d Dep't 1988) (holding that appreciation of husband's per-
sonal injury award resulting from prudent investing by both husband and wife is
marital property, even if market forces accounted for some of the appreciation);
Rider v. Rider, 141 A.D.2d 1004, 1005, 531 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45-46 (3d Dep't 1988)
(awarding share of home built on husband's parcel to wife who had made financial
and non-financial contributions to construction of home); Wegman v. Wegman, 123
A.D.2d 220, 230, 509 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348 (2d Dep't 1986) (holding that appreciation
during marriage of separate property is marital property, if non-titled spouse con-
tributed to such appreciation).
118. The court noted that a money market account, because of interest ac-
crual, will grow over time, independent of any efforts of the non-titled spouse.
Thus, the non-titled spouse should not share in any appreciation of the fund.
Price, 69 N.Y.2d at 18, 503 N.E.2d at 690, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
119. Id.; accord Smith v. Smith, 154 A.D.2d 365, 365, 545 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843
(2d Dep't 1989) (refusing to award non-titled spouse a share of the appreciation of
separate property, because no evidence was offered that such appreciation was
due, at least in part, to the efforts of the non-titled spouse); Lisetza v. Lisetza, 135
A.D.2d 20, 24, 523 N.Y.S.2d 632, 635 (3d Dep't 1988) (holding that passive appreci-
ation of real property owned separately by one spouse is not marital asset).
120. 143 A.D.2d 116, 531 N.Y.S.2d 580 (2d Dep't 1988).
121. Id. at 117, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
122. 166 A.D.2d 428, 560 N.Y.S.2d 665 (2d Dep't 1990), appeal dismissed, 76
N.Y.2d 1017, 566 N.E.2d 1172, 565 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1990).
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minium, which appreciated during the marriage. The wife, a
dentist who, until a disabling injury, practiced during part of
the four-and-one-half-year marriage, "made financial contribu-
tions to the household expenses, often turning over her entire
paycheck to the defendant."123 She also "made significant and
vital contributions as a homemaker, spouse and the primary
caretaker of the parties' infant children."1 24 Based on these
facts, the court concluded that the wife was entitled to a distrib-
utive share of the appreciation of the condominium. 125 No facts
in Robinson suggest that the wife's earnings or efforts as par-
ent, spouse and homemaker contributed directly or indirectly to
the condominium's appreciation, which apparently resulted
from market forces. 126 Robinson therefore departs from Price,
by holding that appreciation to separate property during mar-
riage is subject to equitable distribution, even if the apprecia-
tion was the inevitable consequence of market forces and was
unrelated to any efforts of the non-titled spouse.
E. 'Appreciation" of Careers
The courts have applied the rules governing the distribu-
tion of appreciation of separate property to increases in the
earning potential of a spouse whose license pre-existed the mar-
riage. 27 Even before Price and Robinson, the court in Arvan-
tides v. Arvantides 28 reached an analogous decision concerning
the "appreciation" of a dental practice. The husband graduated
from dental school and established a practice before marrying.
During the marriage the practice flourished. 29 Although find-
ing that the wife's "contribution and efforts as a spouse toward
the dental practice were modest," the court, nevertheless,
granted the wife twenty-five percent of its value. 30
123. Id. at 428, 430, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 666, 667.
124. Id. at 430, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 667 (citations omitted).
125. Id.
126. The court could have reached the same result, without resorting to faulty
reasoning, by finding that part of the wife's financial contributions had been ap-
plied to mortgage payments, entitling the wife to a share of the equity, and thus,
any subsequent appreciation of the equity.
127. See infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
128. 106 A.D.2d 853, 483 N.Y.S.2d 550 (4th Dep't 1984), af/d as modified, 64
N.Y.2d 1033, 478 N.E.2d 199, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1985).
129. Id. at 854, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
130. Id.
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Madori v. Madori'3' involved the "appreciation" of a profes-
sional license. The husband earned his medical degree before
marrying in 1981. During the three years prior to their separa-
tion, the husband acquired experience and credits in emergency
room medicine, but never took the examination for certification
in that specialty.13 2 The wife, who had received a Master's de-
gree in recreation therapy before the marriage, worked in that
field until she assumed the responsibilities of homemaker and
caretaker of the couple's two children. The couple separated in
1984, and the wife commenced the divorce action in 1987.133
Although the husband never sat for the examination in
emergency room medicine, the court held that his stature as an
experienced emergency room practitioner was marital prop-
erty.134 Citing Robinson and Price, the court analogized the en-
hancement of earning potential of a career that pre-existed the
marriage to the appreciation of separate property. 35 The mea-
sure of the "appreciation" of the husband's career in Madori was
the difference between his earning capacity as a general practi-
tioner and his earning capacity as an experienced, though un-
certified, emergency room practitioner. 3 6 Because the wife
sacrificed her career and devoted herself as homemaker and
mother, she was awarded forty percent of the husband's in-
creased earning potential for the projected remainder of his
working life. 137
Similarly, in Elkus, discussed above, the court expressly re-
lied on Price and its progeny in holding that stardom is marital
property.13'
All these decisions are flawed. Neither Arvantides, Madori,
nor Elkus acknowledge that expertise, stature, and a commen-
surate increase in earning potential accompany the pursuit of
almost any career. The court in Kalisch v. Kalisch 39 seemed to
131. 151 Misc. 2d 737, 573 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1991).
132. Id. at 739, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
133. Id. at 741, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
134. Id. at 739, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
135. Id. at 739-40, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
136. Id. at 740, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
137. Id. at 741, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
138. Elkus v. Elkus, 169 A.D.2d 134, 138-39, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903-04 (1st
Dep't 1991).
139. 184 A.D.2d 751, 585 N.Y.S.2d 476 (2d Dep't 1992).
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recognize this fact. Before marrying, the wife received a law
degree and worked as an attorney for the New York City Hous-
ing Authority. Her income increased during the marriage. Re-
lying on Price, her husband argued that he was entitled to share
in the "appreciation" of her career. 140 The court held otherwise,
finding that her earnings would have risen even if she had not
been married. 141
IV. The Merger Doctrine
A. Development of the Merger Doctrine
If the licensed spouse founds or joins a professional prac-
tice, the issue arises whether the non-licensed spouse is entitled
to a distributive share of the license, a distributive share of the
practice, or both. In Marcus v. Marcus,142 the court confronted
this issue. The parties married in 1948. The wife worked as a
full-time social worker until the first of the couple's three chil-
dren was born. The wife then became a child-rearer and home-
maker. Meanwhile, the husband was attending medical school.
He graduated in 1950, and over the next thirty years estab-
lished a successful practice. 143
Recognizing the wife's significant financial and non-finan-
cial contributions to the husband's psychiatric practice, the
court determined that the wife was entitled to a distributive
share of the practice.144 The issue which remained was whether
the wife was additionally entitled to a share of the value of the
husband's license to practice psychiatry. The court held that
awarding the wife a share of both the practice and the license
would be duplicative and, therefore, unfair.145 Distinguishing
O'Brien, which involved a newly-acquired license, rather than a
"mature practice," the court said:
The psychiatric practice was an ongoing and viable enterprise at
the time the present action was commenced. Certainly in this sit-
uation, unlike O'Brien v. O'Brien, the medical license should be
deemed to have merged with and been subsumed by the practice
140. Id. at 752, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
141. Id.
142. 137 A.D.2d 131, 525 N.Y.S.2d 238 (2d Dep't 1988).
143. Id. at 134, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
144. Id. at 138-39, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
145. Id. at 139, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
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itself. Thus, if the plaintiff were to receive separate awards repre-
senting her share in the value of the defendant's license and medi-
cal practice, a double recovery might well result.146
The court hastened to add in dictum that if a practice were new
and undeveloped, the non-titled spouse might receive a share in
both the practice and the license. 147 By like reasoning, the court
suggested that if a "mature practice" were sold, the license
would be deemed to have "reemerged" and could, therefore, be
considered marital property. 14
The issue of "reemergence" of a license arose in Behrens v.
Behrens.149 Before commencement of the divorce action, the
husband sold his medical practice, moved to another state, and
opened a new practice.150 Holding that the husband's license to
practice medicine had "reemerged as a significant and separate
asset,"151 the court held that the wife was entitled, not only to a
distributive share of the husband's first practice, but also to a
distributive share of the value of the license. 152
Another question arising under the merger doctrine is how
mature a practice must be to result in a merger of the license
into the practice. In Vanasco v. Vanasco,153 the court held that
an accounting license had fully merged into a twelve-year ac-
counting practice. 54 A four-year law practice, however, was
held in Wells v. Wells 55 to be too undeveloped to justify applica-
tion of the merger doctrine. The Wells court said: "Under the
present circumstances, it appears that plaintiff had not yet de-
veloped a sufficient history of actual earnings in his new prac-
tice (open only four years) to warrant the finding that the value
146. Id.
147. Id. at 140, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
148. Id., 525 N.Y.S.2d at 242-43. The license only "reemerges" where the li-
censed spouse "intends to open or has recently opened another practice" when the
divorce action is commenced. Id.
149. 143 A.D.2d 617, 532 N.Y.S.2d 893 (2d Dep't 1988).
150. Id. at 620, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 132 Misc. 2d 227, 503 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1986).
154. Id. at 230, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 482; accord Gardner v. Gardner, 148 Misc. 2d
215, 216, 560 N.Y.S.2d 586, 588 (Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1991) (holding that a
law degree had merged into a twelve-year, part-time law practice).
155. 177 A.D.2d 779, 576 N.Y.S.2d 390 (3d Dep't 1991).
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of his professional license had merged into his practice." 156 A
"partial merger" having resulted, the court held that the wife,
who had contributed financially to the husband's legal educa-
tion, was entitled to a share of the license as well as a share of
the practice. 157
A similar result was reached in Jones v. Jones,58 wherein
the husband, who had received a medical degree during the
marriage, worked part-time in his own practice and part-time
as a salaried physician. The court held that the six-year, part-
time medical practice was still in the formative phase and, con-
sequently, that the medical license had merged only partially
into the practice. 59 The unmerged portion of the license was
valuated by considering the husband's actual earnings as a sal-
aried physician, rather than the average earnings of a physi-
cian.160 The wife was awarded fifty percent of the license, but
only thirty percent of the practice, because she had contributed
more significantly to the acquisition of the license than she had
to the development of the practice.' 61
B. Assault on the Merger Doctrine
The purpose of the merger doctrine is to prevent the non-
licensed spouse from gaining double recovery. 6 2 Recently, how-
ever, this sensible doctrine has been reinterpreted and thereby
eviscerated. In Finocchio v. Finocchio,6 3 the husband received
a law degree during the marriage and established a practice,
which, at the time of the divorce action, was fourteen years old.
All five justices on the panel agreed that the practice was "ma-
ture," and accordingly that the license had merged into the
156. Id. at 780, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
157. Id., 576 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
158. 144 Misc. 2d 295, 543 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1989).
159. Id. at 300, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 1019.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 304, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 1021. Ironically, the husband was penalized
for his industry. If he had not worked simultaneously as both a staff physician and
a private practitioner, the wife would have received a less generous award.
162. Marcus v. Marcus, 135 A.D.2d 216, 525 N.Y.S.2d 238 (2d Dep't 1988); see
generally Robert D. Lang, Divorce, Separation and Your Law License and Practice:
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, N.Y. ST. B.J., July/Aug. 1991, at 46, 47.
163. 162 A.D.2d 1044, 556 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (4th Dep't 1990).
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practice. 64 The justices, however, could not agree on how to ap-
ply the merger doctrine. Four of them came to the dubious con-
clusion that, even where there is a mature practice, the non-
licensed spouse is entitled to a distributive share of both the
practice and the future earning potential of the practice over the
projected working life of the licensed spouse. 165 According to the
majority, Marcus did not intend "to apply merger in a way
which would deprive the non-licensee spouse of an award of any
interest of the marital asset beyond commencement of the mat-
rimonial action."166 To support its holding, the court cited
rather ambiguous dictum appearing in a footnote in McGowan,
which says:
It should be noted that once the "student-spouse" embarks on his
career and develops a history of actual earnings, the methodology
outlined above [the difference between the average total lifetime
income of a college graduate and the average total lifetime income
of a physician reduced to present value] should be discarded and
the projections of future earnings should be based on actual past
earnings produced by actual practice.167
In a persuasive dissent, Justice Lawton argued that,
although the majority's position was based ostensibly on the
merger doctrine enunciated in Marcus, it was a veiled repudia-
tion of that very doctrine. 168 The majority was, in Justice Law-
ton's view, granting the wife double recovery by awarding her a
share of both the practice and the future earning capacity of her
husband. 6 9 Justice Lawton said: "In my opinion, since the de-
fendant's license has fully merged into his practice, the majority
incorrectly engrafts the license valuing methodology of en-
164. Id. at 1045, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1008-09 (majority opinion); see also id. at
1047, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1010 (Lawton, J., dissenting).
165. Finocchio, 162 A.D.2d at 1045, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1009.
166. Id.
167. McGowan v. McGowan, 142 A.D.2d 355, 359 n.*, 535 N.Y.S.2d 990, 992-
93 n.* (2d Dep't 1988), quoted in Finocchio, 162 A.D.2d at 1046, 556 N.Y.S.2d at
1009.
168. Finocchio, 162 A.D.2d at 1047, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1010 (Lawton, J., dissent-
ing); see also BRETr R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY, § 6.19A, at
208-09 (Cum. Supp. 1992) (arguing that Finocchio and DiCaprio cannot be recon-
ciled with Marcus, but that they, rather than Marcus, follow logically from
O'Brien).
169. Finocchio, 162 A.D.2d at 1047, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1009-10 (Lawton, J.,
dissenting).
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hanced earning capacity onto the methodology used in valuing a
practice."170
It appears that Justice Lawton's interpretation of the
merger doctrine is correct.' 7 ' In remanding the case, the Mar-
cus court said, "we direct that the hearing court, in reaching a
determination as to the plaintiff's appropriate share in the
value of the defendant's license and psychiatric practice, shall
value the practice as a single asset and render one distributive
award therefor to the plaintiff."7 2 The court did not award a
share of future earnings generated by the practice.
Justice Lawton's view is also more sensible than that of the
majority. Projected lifetime earnings are used to estimate the
value of newly-received licenses because no direct means is
available for valuating them. 7 3 By contrast, a mature practice
has an ascertainable fair market value. The fair market value
of a practice may, for example, be computed by taking a multi-
ple of past earnings. 7 4 A partnership may be valuated by refer-
ence to the withdrawal or death benefits provision of the
relevant partnership agreement, which often includes compen-
sation for capital contributions, accounts receivable, work in
process, and hypothetical future earnings. 75 Therefore, an
170. Id.
171. A lower court decision, which pre-dates Finocchio, reached a result con-
sistent with Justice Lawton's view. In Parlow v. Parlow, 145 Misc. 2d 850, 548
N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1989), the husband received a
teacher's license during the marriage which ended fifteen years later. Holding
that the license had merged into the husband's career, the court ruled that the wife
was not entitled to share in his future earning potential. Id. at 855-56, 548
N.Y.S.2d at 376. Although there was no practice in which the wife could share, the
court explained that she had benefited from fifteen years of the husband's income
as a teacher. Id. at 857, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 377. But see Gardner v. Gardner, 148
Misc. 2d 215, 560 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1990). In Gardner, the
court held that a law license had fully merged into a part-time practice, id. at 217,
560 N.Y.S.2d at 588, and awarded the wife a share of the husband's projected in-
creased lifetime earnings, measured by the earnings generated by the partnership
less the earnings of the average college graduate in the husband's ethnic group.
Id. at 217-18, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 588-89. The court made no separate award for the
value of the practice. Id. at 216, 560 N.Y.S.2d 587-88.
172. Marcus, 137 A.D.2d at 139-140, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
173. Id. at 140, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
174. Finocchio, 162 A.D.2d at 1046, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1008; see supra notes
128-30 and accompanying text.
175. See Harmon v. Harmon, 173 A.D.2d 98, 104, 578 N.Y.S.2d 897, 901 (1st
Dep't 1992).
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award of a share of both the partnership and projected income
is duplicative. Where a mature practice exists, there is no
sound reason to award a share of the projected earnings of the
practice in addition to the value of the practice.
The same appellate division panel that decided Finocchio
reached a like result in DiCaprio v. DiCaprio.176 During the
twenty-nine year marriage, the husband received a Master's de-
gree and teaching certificate. These credentials enabled him to
secure employment as a school administrator. The supreme
court held that the degree and certificate were marital property,
but declined to award the wife a distributive share in the hus-
band's lifetime potential earnings. Rather, it awarded the wife
substantial maintenance. 177 The appellate division modified.
Although conceding that the degree and certificate had merged
into the husband's career, the majority, as in Finocchio, ruled
that the wife was entitled to share in the husband's projected
earnings. 78 The court measured such earnings by actual past
earnings rather than by the hypothetical earnings of a typical
school administrator. 79 Because the wife, during the long mar-
riage, had contributed financially and as mother, spouse, and
homemaker to the acquisition of her husband's degree and cer-
tificate, she was awarded twenty-five percent of the husband's
lifetime projected earnings. 80
Again dissenting, Justice Lawton noted that the majority,
while conceding that the husband's degree and certificate had
merged into his career, had misapplied the merger doctrine.' 8'
Justice Lawton observed that once a merger occurs, a degree or
certificate no longer has value independent of the career. 8 2
Where a license merges into a private practice or business, the
practice or business becomes marital property and is subject to
equitable distribution. 8 3 Similarly, where the recipient of a li-
cense or degree does not go into private practice or business, but
rather works for wages, the license or degree merges into the
176. 162 A.D.2d 944, 556 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (4th Dep't 1990).
177. Id. at 944-45, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1011-12.
178. Id. at 945, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1012.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 946, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1012.
181. Id. at 946-47, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1013 (Lawton, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 946, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
183. Id. at 946-47, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
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career.84 In Justice Lawton's view, however, a career, unlike a
professional practice or business, does not constitute marital
property and cannot properly be valuated or distributed. 8 5
Justice Lawton faulted the majority for fashioning a rule
which would entitle a non-licensed spouse to share in the life-
time earnings of the licensed spouse whenever the licensed
spouse's earning capacity increased during marriage. 8 6 He ar-
gued that since increased earning capacity is a typical if not in-
evitable consequence of any career, virtually all marriages will,
under the majority's position, result in the division of the pro-
jected lifetime earnings of the principal wage earner. 8 7 Such
an approach "transmute[s] the bonds of marriage into the bonds
of involuntary servitude."188 Justice Lawton aptly suggested
that appropriate maintenance awards are a proper way to com-
pensate non-titled spouses for career advancements of titled
spouses. 8 9
V. Accrual Issues
A. Accrual of Distributive Rights
A license may be earned only partially during a marriage or
it may be earned entirely before the marriage, but awarded dur-
ing the marriage. The courts have been called upon to decide
whether such licenses are marital property. 90
In McGowan v. McGowan,'91 the wife completed the re-
quirements for a teaching certificate prior to the marriage, but
184. Id. at 947, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1013.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 947-48, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1013-14.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 947, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1013 (quoting Severs v. Severs, 426 So. 2d
992, 994 (Fla. 1983)); see also Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991)
(holding that a medical license is not marital property) ("The time has long since
passed when a person's personal attributes and talents were thought to be subject
to monetary valuation for commercial purposes. In short, we do not recognize a
property interest in personal characteristics of another person such as intelligence,
skill, judgment, and temperament, however characterized.").
189. DiCaprio, 162 A.D.2d at 948, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 1013 (Lawton, J.,
dissenting).
190. Cf Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 490-92, 463 N.E.2d 15, 19-
21, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699, 703-05 (1984) (holding that a pension vesting during a mar-
riage was subject to distribution to the extent earned during the marriage).
191. 142 A.D.2d 355, 535 N.Y.S.2d 990, (2d Dep't 1988).
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the certificate was not awarded until after the wedding.192 Af-
ter twenty-four years of marriage the wife commenced a divorce
action. The husband argued that since the wife's teaching cer-
tificate was awarded after the parties had married, it was mari-
tal property.193 Rejecting this argument, the court said that
"[t]he real thing of value, that is, the plaintiffs increased skill,
knowledge and ability.., was acquired before the marriage and
must therefore be deemed separate property." 94 O'Brien, said
the court, was intended to remedy the social injustice which oc-
curs when one spouse supports another through an educational
program only to face divorce before enjoying the economic fruits
of that program. 95 The court concluded that the policy underly-
ing O'Brien, to remedy this injustice, would be frustrated rather
than served by allowing the non-titled spouse, simply because of
fortuitous timing, to share in the benefits of a license or degree
earned prior to the marriage but conferred during the mar-
riage. 96 This decision is inconsistent with Price, which held
that where the non-titled spouse contributes either directly or
indirectly to the appreciation of separate property, the non-ti-
tled spouse may share in the appreciation. 97 Thus, under
Price, the court should have considered the husband's contribu-
tions to the wife's career advancements during their twenty-
four year marriage.
In Kyle v. Kyle, 198 the issue was whether a course of study
begun, but not completed during marriage, is marital property.
The Kyles were married for thirty-two years. The husband, an
assistant principal, had nearly completed a course of study cul-
minating in the attainment of a principal's license, when the
divorce action was commenced. The court reached a decision at
odds with McGowan, holding that since he had not completed
the requirements for the license during the marriage, the li-
cense was not marital property. 99
192. Id. at 362, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
193. Id.
194. Id., 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
195. Id. at 362-63, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
196. Id. at 363, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
197. See supra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
198. 156 A.D.2d 508, 548 N.Y.S.2d 781 (2d Dep't 1989).
199. Id. at 510, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 783; accord Berkman v. Berkman, 149 Misc.
2d 131, 133, 563 N.Y.S.2d 990, 991 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1990) (holding that
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A final variation of this issue is when a spouse earns a pro-
fessional degree before marrying, but is not licensed to practice
until satisfying additional requirements, which are completed
after marrying. In Shoenfeld v. Shoenfeld,200 the parties mar-
ried after the husband earned his medical degree in Mexico and
returned to this country. During the first year of the marriage
only the wife worked, while the husband completed a pathway
program enabling him to practice medicine in the United
States.201 The issue was whether the wife, who had contributed
to the husband's completion of the pathway program, but not to
his attainment of the medical degree, was entitled to a distribu-
tive share of the value of the medical license and newly-formed
practice. The court held that the wife's contribution was suffi-
cient to entitle her to a share of the value of both the license20 2
and practice.203 Again, the court provided the unlicensed
spouse with the broadest possible remedy.
B. Cessation of Accrual of Distributive Rights
Section 236(B)(1)(c) defines "marital property" as all prop-
erty acquired by the spouses "during the marriage and before
the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement
of a matrimonial action."204 Thus, any property acquired by
either spouse after execution of a separation agreement, or after
commencement of a "matrimonial action," is not marital prop-
erty and is consequently not subject to equitable distribution.
The issue in Anglin v. Anglin20 5 was whether a separation
action is a "matrimonial action" for purposes of section
236(B)(1)(c). 206 The wife in Anglin commenced a separation ac-
college course credits earned without a degree do not increase earning capacity
and are therefore not marital property and stressing that earning such credits
does not demonstrate the "finality of accomplishment [shown by] attainment of a
degree....").
200. 168 A.D.2d 674, 563 N.Y.S.2d 500 (2d Dep't 1990).
201. Id. at 674, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
202. Id. at 675, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
203. Id. Since the practice had been in existence for less than two years, the
court did not apply the merger doctrine. Id.; see supra notes 142-61 and accompa-
nying text.
204. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986) (emphasis added).
205. 80 N.Y.2d 553, 607 N.E.2d 777, 592 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1992).
206. Prior to Anglin, three of the departments of the appellate division held
that a spouse is entitled to share in property acquired by the other spouse after the
1994]
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tion in 1982, which was not concluded until 1988 when the par-
ties stipulated to a judgment of separation. Thereafter, the wife
brought a divorce action. 207 The husband moved for partial
summary judgment seeking a determination that property ac-
quired by either spouse, after the commencement of the separa-
tion action, was not marital property.208 The wife opposed the
motion arguing that property acquired by either spouse until
the commencement of the divorce action was marital
property.20 9
The husband relied on section 236(B)(2), 210 which sets forth
a general definition of "matrimonial actions." That subsection
provides, in pertinent part, that "the provisions of this part
shall be applicable to actions for ... a separation." 211 Based on
commencement of a separation action. Id. at 555-56, 607 N.E.2d at 779, 592
N.Y.S.2d at 632; Petre v. Petre, 122 A.D.2d 559, 505 N.Y.S.2d 396, (4th Dep't),
affg, 130 Misc. 2d 333, 334, 496 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1985)
(holding that Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(2) is inapposite when considering
termination of distributive rights, and that a separation action will therefore not
cut off such rights); accord Jolis v. Jolis, 98 A.D.2d 692, 693, 470 N.Y.S.2d 584,
585-86 (1st Dep't 1983); see Verrilli v. Verrilli, 172 A.D.2d 990, 992-93, 568
N.Y.S.2d 495, 497 (3d Dep't 1991) (holding that the non-titled spouse has distribu-
tive rights in property acquired by the other spouse after separation, without dis-
cussing relevant sections of the Domestic Relations Law); Greenwald v.
Greenwald, 164 A.D.2d 706, 713-14, 565 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (1st Dep't 1991)
(awarding wife distributive share of appreciation to property acquired by husband
with marital assets after separation, because wife had continued as the caretaker
of the couple's son and had maintained a close business and personal relationship
with the husband, even after the separation). Contra Lennon v. Lennon, 124
A.D.2d 788, 790, 508 N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (2d Dep't 1986) (applying the definition of
marital property in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(2) to terminate distributive
rights after commencement of separation action). The court in Lennon noted that
the separation action signalled a clear end of the "economic partnership" of the
parties. Id.
207. Anglin, 80 N.Y.2d at 554-55, 607 N.E.2d at 778, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
208. Id. at 555, 607 N.E.2d at 778, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 555-56, 607 N.E.2d at 779, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
211. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(2) (McKinney 1986) provides in pertinent
part:
Matrimonial actions. Except as provided in subdivision five of this part, the
provisions of this part shall be applicable to actions for an annulment or
dissolution of a marriage, for a divorce, for a separation, for the declaration
of the nullity of a void marriage, for a declaration of the validity or nullity of
a foreign judgment of divorce, for a declaration of the validity or nullity of a
marriage, and to proceedings to obtain maintenance or a distribution of
marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce, commenced on and
after the effective date of this part.
892
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this subsection, the husband contended that a separation action
terminates distributive rights in property acquired after
separation.21 2
Judge Bellacosa, writing for a four to two majority, rejected
this argument, pointing out that the husband's interpretation of
the statute leads to a paradoxical result. The list of "matrimo-
nial actions" in section 236(B)(2) includes actions "for the decla-
ration of the nullity.., of a foreign judgment of divorce [and] for
the declaration of the validity... of a marriage."213 It would be
nonsensical for such actions, whose objective is to preserve mar-
riages, to terminate the accrual of marital property rights. 214
The court, therefore, concluded that the list of "matrimonial ac-
tions" in section 236(B)(2) is inappropriate for determining
what actions terminate a spouse's rights to property acquired
by the other spouse.215
The husband also argued that an action for separation sig-
nals the end of a couple's economic partnership, and thus, that
property acquired after such an action should not be subject to
equitable distribution.21 6 Unpersuaded, the court noted that an
action for separation may not sever the economic ties of mar-
riage. "Objective verification" of the end of the economic part-
nership comes with an action for divorce, dissolution, or
annulment, but not with an action for separation. 21 7 On the
other hand, the court noted that, unlike a separation action, a
separation agreement often results in the termination of the
economic partnership.218 Thus, the court concluded, it is sensi-
ble that section 236(B)(1)(c) provides that property acquired by
one spouse after a separation agreement is not marital prop-
erty.219 The majority added that its holding promoted the legis-
lative intent, which is to expand the non-titled spouse's
property rights.220
Id. (footnote omitted).
212. Anglin, 80 N.Y.2d at 556-57, 607 N.E.2d at 779, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
213. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(2).
214. Anglin, 80 N.Y.2d at 556, 607 N.E.2d at 779, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 556-57, 607 N.E.2d at 779, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
217. Id. at 557, 607 N.E.2d at 779, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
218. Id., 607 N.E.2d at 780, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
219. Id. at 557-58, 607 N.E.2d at 780, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
220. Id. at 558-59, 607 N.E.2d at 780-81, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34.
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Judge Hancock dissented. He urged that an action for sep-
aration marks the functional end of a marriage's economic part-
nership. 221 Once such an action has been commenced, trust and
cooperation have been displaced by disunity and conflict. He
observed that a separation may last years. It would make no
sense to share property acquired during a protracted period
when the couple no longer shares a community of interests.222
He found the majority's premise - that a separation agreement
evidences a greater rift in the economic partnership than does a
separation action - illogical. Both a separation agreement and
a separation action involve living apart, exclusive possession of
the marital home, and the payment of maintenance. 2 3 In fact,
a separation agreement demonstrates at least some degree of
cooperation between the parties, whereas a separation action
indicates more acrimony. 224
Despite Judge Hancock's persuasive arguments to the con-
trary, it would appear that the majority in Anglin correctly in-
terpreted the equitable distribution statute. Section 236(B)(2),
on which the husband relied, is inapplicable. That subsection
provides: "Matrimonial actions. Except as provided in subdivi-
sion five of this part, the provisions of this part shall be applica-
ble to actions for an annulment or dissolution of a marriage, for
a divorce, for a separation [and several other actions]."225 Sub-
division five enumerates those actions which trigger rights to
equitable distribution. A separation action is not included in
this list.226 The Anglin decision, therefore, appears to construe
the statute properly. 227 Yet, one must question the wisdom of
221. Id. at 559, 607 N.E.2d at 781, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 634 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
222. Id. at 561, 607 N.E.2d at 782, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
223. Id. at 563, 607 N.E.2d at 783, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
224. Id., 607 N.E.2d at 783-84, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37.
225. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(2) (McKinney 1986) (emphasis added).
226. Id. § 236(B)(5).
227. Justice Levine, who wrote for a three to two majority at the appellate
division, observed that the husband had disregarded the all-important introduc-
tory phrase to section 236(B)(2). Anglin v. Anglin, 173 A.D.2d 133, 135, 577
N.Y.S.2d 963, 965 (3d Dep't 1992). Justice Levine reasoned that the purpose of
section 236(B)(2) is not to provide a comprehensive definition of matrimonial ac-
tions to be applied throughout the statute. Id. Rather, the purpose is to provide a
more limited definition of matrimonial actions to be applied to the parts of the
statute dealing with such matters as maintenance and child support. Id. at 135-
36, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
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the statute itself, which codifies the untenable presumption
that the economic partnership of a marriage survives the filing
of an action for separation.
VI. Valuation of Licenses and Practices
In valuating licenses, courts generally compute the differ-
ence between the average lifetime earnings expectancy of a per-
son with the license and the average lifetime earnings
expectancy of that spouse had he or she not received the li-
cense. 228 The court may consider the ethnic group of the li-
censed spouse in determining anticipated earnings. 229
Ordinarily, the person's working life is deemed to continue until
age sixty-five. 230 This projection is adjusted for taxes and infla-
tion and discounted to present value. 23' Where immediate pay-
ment would impose a burden on the licensed spouse, the court
may permit periodic partial payments. 232 Compound interest
228. E.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 582, 489 N.E.2d 712, 714, 498
N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (1985); Madori v. Madori, 151 Misc. 2d 737, 739, 573 N.Y.S.2d
553, 555 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1991), Jones v. Jones, 144 Misc. 2d 295,
301, 543 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1019 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1989).
229. Gardner v. Gardner, 148 Misc. 2d 215, 217, 560 N.Y.S.2d 586, 588 (Sup.
Ct. Allegany County 1990) (basing earning potential on ethnic group of lawyer-
husband); Jones, 144 Misc. 2d at 301, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 1019-20 (basing earning
potential of black physician on lifetime income of average black physician).
230. E.g., Madori, 151 Misc. 2d at 740, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 555. But see Savasta v.
Savasta, 146 Misc. 2d 101, 108, 549 N.Y.S.2d 544, 549 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1989) (expecting 38-year old to work 25 more years).
231. E.g., O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749;
McGowan v. McGowan, 142 A.D.2d 355, 358, 362, 535 N.Y.S.2d 990, 992, 994 (2d
Dep't 1988); see Jones, 144 Misc. 2d at 300, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 1019. In Jones, the
husband's projected earnings were based on his salary as a part-time physician
working for a hospital. The court used a 5% inflation rate to project his salary
until age 65, and a 10% inflation rate to discount his lifetime earnings to present
value. Id. at 301-02, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 1020; see also Gardner, 148 Misc. 2d at 218,
560 N.Y.S.2d at 58 (applying a 10% inflation rate to discount future earnings to
present value).
232. E.g., DiCaprio v. DiCaprio, 162 A.D.2d 944, 946, 556 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1012
(4th Dep't 1990) (ordering husband to pay wife $19,487.50, representing 25% inter-
est in certificate in school administration, in four yearly installments); Maloney v.
Maloney, 137 A.D.2d 666, 667, 524 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 (2d Dep't 1988) (ordering
that husband pay wife $456,632, representing 35% interest in medical license, in
ten yearly installments); see, e.g., Harmon v. Harmon, 173 A.D.2d 98, 106, 112, 578
N.Y.S.2d 897, 901, 905 (1st Dep't 1992) (ordering husband to pay wife $292,870,
representing 50% interest in law partnership, in six equal payments over three
years).
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may be added to such payments.233
Once merger has occurred, the courts must valuate the pro-
fessional practice. In Neyhorayoff v. Neyhorayoff,234 the hus-
band had an interest in a closely held professional corporation.
Noting that the asset value of the business was negligible,235 the
court adopted the "capitalization of earnings" method, under
which yearly earnings are multiplied by a factor determined by
the nature, history, and prospects of the enterprise. 236
Facing an essentially identical problem, the trial court in
Matsuo v. Matsuo23 7 valuated a medical practice, also doing
business as a professional corporation, by determining its "book
value," computed by subtracting liabilities from depreciated
tangible assets.238 The appellate division reversed, holding that
the lower court had erred in failing to consider income. 239
The court took a different approach in Gardner v. Gard-
ner.240 There, the husband devoted one-quarter of his working
time to a law practice, which yielded twenty-four percent of his
income. 241 To valuate the practice, the court calculated the dif-
ference between the income the practice generated and twenty-
four percent of the average income of a college graduate of the
same age and race as the husband.242 It then multiplied this
figure by the remainder of the husband's expected working life,
233. Maloney, 137 A.D.2d at 667, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (providing for an 8%
rate of compound interest on periodic payments).
234. 108 Misc. 2d 311, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981).
235. Id. at 318, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
236. Id. at 319, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
237. 124 A.D.2d 864, 508 N.Y.S.2d 630 (3d Dep't 1986).
238. Id. at 865, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
239. Id.
240. 148 Misc. 2d 215, 560 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1991).
241. Id. at 218, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 588-89. The court held that the license had
fully merged into the practice. Id. at 217, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 588. Yet it employed the
methodology recommended in O'Brien for valuating licenses, overlooking or disre-
garding Marcus v. Marcus, 135 A.D.2d 216, 525 N.Y.S.2d 238 (2d Dep't 1988),
which instructs that after merger future earnings should not be considered in val-
uating a practice. Gardner, 148 Misc. 2d at 217, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 588; see supra
notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
242. Gardner, 148 Misc. 2d at 218, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 589. The court employed
faulty reasoning in basing its calculation on the percentage of the husband's earn-
ings which the practice generated, rather than on the percentage of the husband's
working time devoted to the practice. In Gardner, since the two percentages were
nearly identical, the error was slight.
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and discounted to present value. 243 Because the evidence indi-
cated that the income generated by the practice would not grow
faster than the income of the average college graduate, the
court's computations did not reflect an increasing yearly
differential. 244
The courts have held that where a partnership agreement
exists, such agreement may be determinative in valuating the
practice. 245 In Dignan v. Dignan,246 the wife sought through
discovery, various documents, including partnership tax re-
turns, relating to the husband's law practice, to aid her in valu-
ating the practice. The court denied the request. 247 Because the
partnership agreement limited the husband's interest in the
partnership to his capital account, no other factors, such as
work in process, accounts receivable, or goodwill, were
relevant. 248
A more detailed analysis of problems encountered when us-
ing an agreement to valuate a partner's interest in a practice
was presented in Harmon v. Harmon.249 This case is yet an-
other example of the court's predilection to redistribute wealth
upon divorce, rather than to effect a fair division of property.
The parties married in 1966. One year later, the husband grad-
uated from law school, after which he became associated with a
law firm.250 Some years later he became a partner. In the year
preceding the divorce action the husband earned $127,000.251
The wife worked at least part-time during most of the marriage,
and forewent promising career opportunities so that she could
devote substantial attention to one of the couple's two children,
a boy who had autistic characteristics. 252
243. Id.
244. Id. at 219, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
245. See infra notes 257-74 and accompanying text; cf Rosenberg v. Rosen-
berg, 126 A.D.2d 537, 539, 510 N.Y.S.2d 659, 662 (2d Dep't 1987) (holding that a
buy-sell agreement with respect to restricted stock should be used to valuate inter-
est in corporation).
246. 156 A.D.2d 995, 549 N.Y.S.2d 539 (4th Dep't 1989).
247. Id. at 995, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40.
248. Id. at 996, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
249. 173 A.D.2d 98, 578 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1st Dep't 1992).
250. Id. at 101, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 898-99.
251. Id., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
252. Id.
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The issue in Harmon was how to valuate the husband's in-
terest in the law firm. The husband argued that section 11(b) of
the partnership agreement, titled "Return of Capital," was con-
trolling.253 That provision provided a retiring, disabled, or with-
drawing partner with his or her capital account. 254 Section
18(c) of the agreement did not provide a withdrawing partner
with any interest in "work in process, uncollected accounts,
good will or any other matter or cause."255 Reading these two
provisions together, the husband argued that, as in Dignan, his
interest in the partnership was limited to the value of his capi-
tal account, which was approximately $85,000.256
The wife relied on sections 12(a) and (d) of the partnership
agreement, the death benefits provision, which provided for the
payment of the deceased partner's capital account plus 1.75
times the average salary of the deceased partner over the three
years preceding death.257 This method resulted in a figure of
approximately $293,000.258 According to the wife's expert, the
salary component of death benefits implicitly provided compen-
sation for work in process, accounts receivable, and goodwill.259
The court favored the wife's approach, agreeing that, unlike
the withdrawal provision, the death benefits provision 260 in-
cluded compensation for work in process, uncollected accounts,
and goodwill, 261 and therefore set a realistic value on the hus-
253. Id. at 104, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 106, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 900-01.
257. Id. at 105, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
258. Id. at 106, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
259. Id. at 105, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 901. The husband contended that, were the
court to adopt this approach, estate taxes theoretically owed should be subtracted
from the value of his partnership interest. Id. The court disagreed because the
event triggering tax liability, the death of the husband, had not occurred. Id. See
generally Leonard G. Florescue, Harmon and Economic Reality, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 10,
1992, at 3, 14 (suggesting that the court erred in refusing to consider the effect of
estate taxes on the husband's partnership interest).
260. Harmon, 173 A.D.2d at 106-07, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 901; see also Stolowitz v.
Stolowitz, 106 Misc. 2d 853, 858, 435 N.Y.S.2d 882, 886 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1980) (stating that a death benefits provision in a partnership agreement is appro-
priate for valuating an interest in the partnership for purposes of equitable
distribution).
261. Some experts consider goodwill to be an essential component of the value
of a professional practice. See Cameron, supra note 44, at 340; Gary B. Cheifetz,
Valuing the Attorney's Law Practice, 720 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 57, 59-60
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band's interest in the partnership.262 In so holding, the court
declared that "[t]he valuation of a marital asset, particularly an
intangible asset such as an interest in a professional partner-
ship, must be founded in economic reality."263 Unsupported by
any express language in the partnership agreement or any ex-
trinsic evidence, the court's inference that the death benefits
provision included compensation for work in process, uncol-
lected accounts, and good will appears to have been based solely
on its desire to award the wife more than the relatively small
sum which would have resulted from division of the husband's
capital account. 264
The husband argued that using the death benefits provi-
sion was employing a fiction and was, therefore, inappropri-
ate.265 The court responded that the husband's proposed
method of valuation, using the "withdrawal provision," was no
less a fiction, because he had not withdrawn from the partner-
ship.266 The court, however, failed to recognize that an objective
of a death benefits provision is to ensure the financial security
of the deceased partner's family. Thus, such a provision may
reflect an inflated estimate of the deceased partner's interest in
the firm. One may question whether the court adhered to the
very test of "economic reality" that it espoused.
VII. A Proposal for Change
Faced with the inequities spawned by O'Brien and cases
which have followed and expanded it, one must consider alter-
natives which might lead to fairer results. Some have argued
that the speculative nature of a distributive award based on the
projected lifetime earnings occasioned by the acquisition of a li-
cense would be ameliorated if the award could be modified to
(1991). This view, however, is not universal. See generally JOHN D. GREGORY, THE
LAW OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, 6.03[2], at 6-8 to 6-17 (1989).
262. Harmon, 173 A.D.2d at 107, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 902. While it is appropriate
to valuate an interest in a partnership by reference to the withdrawal, death or
retirement provisions of a partnership agreement, the value of good will must ordi-
narily be separately valuated, since few agreements provide compensation for
goodwill. See generally Cameron, supra note 44, at 339.
263. Harmon, 173 A.D.2d at 107, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
264. See id. at 105, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
265. Id. at 106, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 901-02.
266. Id., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
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accord with changed circumstances. 267  However, as Judge
Meyer pointed out in his concurrence in O'Brien, Domestic Rela-
tions Law section 236(B)(9)(b), which expressly allows modifica-
tions in maintenance and child support,268 seems by implication
to foreclose modification with respect to distributive awards. 269
One alternative to O'Brien is providing the non-titled
spouse with restitution or "reimbursement alimony."270 Under
this view, the non-licensed spouse is repaid for financial contri-
butions to the other spouse's acquisition of the license.271 This
remedy, although avoiding the pitfall of being speculative, is in-
adequate. Having contributed to the acquisition of a valuable
license, the non-licensed spouse deserves more than mere
restitution.272
267. E.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 592, 489 N.E.2d 712, 720-21, 498
N.Y.S.2d 743, 751-52 (1985) (Meyer, J. concurring); see generally Burns & Grauer,
supra note 4, at 532; Lynch, supra note 4, at 359; Willoughby, supra note 4, at 153-
55.
268. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(9)(b) (McKinney 1986) provides in perti-
nent part: "Upon application by either party, the court may annul or modify any
prior order or judgment as to maintenance or child support, upon a showing of the
recipient's inability to be self-supporting or a substantial change in circumstance,
including financial hardship."
269. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 591, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751
(Meyer, J. concurring); see Willoughby, supra note 4, at 153-54 (agreeing with the
O'Brien court that licenses are marital property, and suggesting that, to prevent
the injustices imposed by awarding the non-licensed spouse a share of projected
lifetime earnings of the licensed spouse, the legislature amend the law of equitable
distribution to permit the modification of distributive awards).
270. The terms "alimony" and "maintenance" are used in this article
interchangeably.
271. A number of courts have awarded reimbursement alimony as compensa-
tion for a spouse's contributions to the other spouse's acquisition of a license or
degree. E.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981); Pacht v.
Jadd, 469 N.E.2d 918, 921 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473,478
(W. Va. 1988); see also In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct. App.
1982), superseded, 691 P.2d 1020 (Cal. 1984) (applying newly amended CAL. Civ.
CODE § 4800.3(a)(1), (d) (West 1983) (providing reimbursement as the exclusive
remedy to non-licensed spouse for contributions made to education of the licensed
spouse), repealed and reenacted by Act approved July 11, 1992, ch. 162, §§ 5, 10,
1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. 412, 412, 463 (West) (codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641
(West Supp. 1994))); see generally, Lynch, supra note 4, at 553; Bruce W. Stanfill,
Comment, The Equity/Property Dilemma: Analyzing The Working Spouse's Con-
tributions To The Other's Educational Degree At Divorce, 23 Hous. L. REV. 991,
1011 (1986).
272. Judge Simons found maintenance unsatisfactory, regardless of its form,
because it implicitly contradicts the policy that marriage is an economic partner-
ship. He also stressed that, since maintenance terminates upon remarriage, "a
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Another perhaps more acceptable alternative is to add
to the award of restitution an award of "rehabilitative ali-
mony"273 to compensate the non-licensed spouse for career
opportunities sacrificed. 274 Even this remedy provides too
little.275 The non-licensed spouse deserves compensation which
working spouse [a spouse who supported the other spouse through an educational
program] may never receive adequate consideration ...for the decision to re-
marry." O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 587, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d
743, 748 (1985). See generally HENRY H. FOSTER & RONALD L. BROWN, CONTEMPO-
RARY MATRMONLA LAW IssuEs: A GUIDE To DIVORCE ECONOMICS & PRACTICE 237
(1985) (arguing that an "out-of-pocket" rule fails to compensate a working spouse
for lost expectations); Daniel E. Burke, Comment, Tl Graduation Do We Part -
The Professional Degree Acquired During Marriage As Marital Property Upon Dis-
solution: An Evaluation And Recommendation For Ohio, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 227,
238 (1987) (criticizing reimbursement alimony because the amount is discretion-
ary and therefore often inadequate); Herman, supra note 4, at 553 (questioning the
adequacy of reimbursement alimony, even if it includes a component for non-finan-
cial contributions); Stanfill, supra note 271, at 1011 (describing reimbursement as
a minimally adequate remedy); Willoughby, supra note 4, at 148 (arguing that a
maintenance award would not have sufficiently compensated Mrs. O'Brien for her
contributions to her husband's career).
273. Rehabilitative alimony is a temporary measure aimed at affording its re-
cipient the opportunity to become self-supporting. See Rosemary S. Sackett &
Cheryl Y, Munyon, Alimony: A Retreat From Traditional Concepts Of Spousal
Support, 35 DRAIK L. REV. 297, 314-15 (1985-86). Such an award pays for training
and educating a divorced spouse who would otherwise encounter difficulty in find-
ing suitable employment. Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses And
Abuses Of Limited Duration Alimony, 21 FAM. L. Q. 573, 581 (1988).
274. Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822-23 (Wyo. 1984):
[The court observed that] where the working spouse supports the family
while the other spouse attends college, obtains an advanced professional de-
gree, and promptly seeks a no-fault divorce, there is no property accumu-
lated to divide.... In this situation, an award to [the working spouse]
which would afford an opportunity to obtain the same degree under the
same circumstances, or in the alternative, a sum of money equal to that
benefit seems equitable.
Accord Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 535 (N.J. 1982); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-
Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 261 (S.D. 1984); see also Sharton, supra note 6, at 754.
275. See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748
(observing that an award of rehabilitative maintenance "frustrates the purposes
underlying the Equitable Distribution Law"); see also Krauskopf, supra note 273,
at 581 (arguing that strict time limitations on rehabilitative alimony may defeat
its purpose); Burns & Grauer, supra note 4, at 510 (questioning the adequacy of
rehabilitative maintenance because it is modifiable and revocable); Sharton, supra
note 6, at 754 (pointing out that rehabilitative maintenance is criticized for not
fully crediting the contributing spouse for contributions to the acquisition of the
license). But see Diamond, supra note 3, at 90-91 (cautioning that rehabilitative
maintenance is subject to abuse in that a recipient who is already capable of self-
support may use the award to train for a new career).
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takes into account the increased earning power of the other
spouse, but not by pretending that the license is property and
shackling the licensed spouse with an unjust burden.276
The most preferable alternative is a two-pronged approach:
to divide marital property so as to recognize the non-licensed
spouse's contributions to the acquisition of a license, but if there
is insufficient property to achieve a satisfactory distribution, to
award and adjust maintenance to reflect the contributions of
the non-licensed spouse.277
New York's equitable distribution law mandates this ap-
proach. As noted above,278 section 236(B)(5)(d)(6), 279 upon
which the O'Brien court placed primary emphasis, does not de-
fine marital property, nor does it say or even imply that a career
or earning potential is marital property.280 Rather, it instructs
276. The labor theory of value proposes that the supporting spouse receive
50% of the licensed spouse's income for as many years as the supporting spouse
contributed to the education of the licensed spouse. See Linda S. Mullinex, The
Valuation Of An Education At Divorce, 16 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 227, 274-79 (1983).
This approach, which has not gained acceptance with the courts, fails to consider
the relative contributions of the spouses, although it could be modified to do so. Id.
at 279, 282. In addition, the licensed spouse may, in the early stage of his or her
career, put the license to minimal use, with the result that the non-licensed spouse
would receive inadequate compensation. See also Callison, supra note 5, at 461-62,
wherein the author suggests that distributive awards to the contributing spouse be
based on the licensed spouse's actual, rather than hypothetical, earnings. Courts
have, on occasion, followed this approach. E.g., Jones v. Jones, 144 Misc. 2d 295,
300-02, 543 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1019-20 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1989).
277. Several jurisdictions, governed by equitable distribution statutes, have
followed this approach. E.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Alaska 1987);
In re Marriage of Stuart, 813 P.2d 49, 51 (Or. 1991); Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d
625, 627 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Wis.
1982). This position has also been adopted in states that have adopted community
property law. Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); In re
Marriage of Washburn, 677 P.2d 152, 158 (Wash. 1984). Other courts have fa-
vored one of the two prongs of this approach, either awarding alimony to compen-
sate the non-licensed spouse, e.g., In re Marriage of Weinstein, 470 N.E.2d 551,
559 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Drapek v. Drapek, 503 N.E.2d 946, 950 (Mass. 1987); Ma-
honey v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 536 (N.J. 1982); Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d
131, 135 (Ohio 1986); see generally Burns & Grauer, supra note 4, at 506, or adjust-
ing the division of marital property to reach an equitable result, e.g., Scott v. Scott,
645 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), Haywood v. Haywood, 415 S.E.2d 565,
570-71 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 425 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. 1993).
278. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
279. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
280. "Marital Property" is defined in N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(1)(c) (Mc-
Kinney 1986).
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the court to consider "direct or indirect contribution[s] made...
to the career or career potential of the other party" in distribut-
ing marital assets.28 ' Thus, under this subsection, when a
spouse contributes to the education or career potential of the
other spouse, the contributing spouse becomes entitled to a
greater share of marital property than would otherwise have
been the case.
When divorce occurs before the couple has accumulated sig-
nificant assets, as was the case in O'Brien, adjusting the divi-
sion of marital property may not provide the contributing
spouse with fair compensation. In such a case, the court should
consider awarding maintenance to compensate the contributing
spouse. Such a maintenance award conforms with the statutory
purpose of maintenance, which the judge awards "as justice re-
quires" based on the "circumstances of the case."282 Mainte-
nance awards have the added benefit of being subject to
modification.283 Thus, if the income of the licensed spouse rises
after the initial award, maintenance may be adjusted accord-
ingly. More critically, however, the statute directs the court, in
establishing a maintenance award, to consider "contributions
and services of the party seeking maintenance as a spouse, par-
ent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career
potential of the other party ... ."284 Maintenance is, therefore,
the statutory mechanism designed to compensate a non-titled
spouse for contributions made to the career potential of the
other spouse when sufficient marital property is unavailable to
fashion an appropriate remedy.
Awarding maintenance to compensate the contributing
spouse has been criticized as inadequate and regressive. 285
Since maintenance terminates upon remarriage, 286 some, in-
cluding the O'Brien court, have argued, notwithstanding the
language of the statute, that maintenance does not provide a
281. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
282. Id. § 236(B)(6)(a).
283. See id. § 236(B)(9)(b).
284. Id. § 236(B)(6)(a)(8).
285. See e.g., O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at
748; Sharton, supra note 6, at 763.
286. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(6)(c) (McKinney 1986).
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suitable remedy for the non-licensed spouse.28 7 However, con-
tributions, whether financial, emotional, or otherwise, to the de-
velopment of a spouse's potential are an inevitable consequence
of marriage and should not create a right to perpetual
compensation.
The O'Brien court also believed that the use of maintenance
in this context violated the policy of the equitable distribution
law. That policy, the court emphasized, is to award a share of
marital assets to the non-titled spouse, "not because that share
is needed, but because those assets represent the capital prod-
uct of what was essentially a partnership entity."288 The circu-
larity of the O'Brien argument is apparent: the statute does not
subsume licenses, degrees, professional distinction, and fame
under the definition of marital property. The courts have re-
shaped the meaning of this term. In their zeal to assure that
economic justice will be done, the courts have usurped the legis-
lative function, expanding the definition of marital property to
the point where, under the most recent extensions of the
O'Brien rule, the result is not justice but absurdity.
VIII. Conclusion
The O'Brien court sought to remedy the injustice suffered
by a divorced spouse who supported the other spouse through
professional school only to be denied the benefits of the degree.
Though its objective is laudable, the doctrine, as an overwhelm-
ing number of jurisdictions have recognized, imposes an unrea-
sonable burden on the licensed spouse. In eliminating one
injustice, the court created another. The courts of New York
can temper the harsh effects of the doctrine by reversing the
trend to expand it, but the solution must ultimately come from
acknowledgement by the New York Court of Appeals or the leg-
islature that the doctrine must be discarded.
287. See e.g., O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at
748; Sharton, supra note 6, at 767-68.
288. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (quot-
ing Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (Sup. Ct. Suf-
folk County 1983)).
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